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Fouraker: Constitutional Law: RICO Forfeitures and the Eighth Amendment: An

CASE COMMENTS

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: RICO FORFEITURES AND
THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT: AN EMERGING
EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE ANALYSIS*
Alexander v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2766 (1993)
Laura Ann Fouraker"
Petitioner, convicted at criminal trial on three counts of violating the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO),' faced forfeiture proceedings under RICO's criminal penalties section.' The trial

* Editor's Note: This case comment received the George W. Milam Outstanding Case
Comment Award for Fall 1993.
** This comment is dedicated to the memory of MJ. Kirby, a marvelous grandfather and a true
inspiration.
1. Alexander v. United States, 113 S. CL 2766, 2769-70 (1993), reh'g denied, 114 S. Ct. 295
(1993). Petitioner was convicted of one count under the three following subsections of 18 U.S.C. §
1962 (1988), which read in relevant part:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or
indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity.., to use or invest, directly or indirectly,
any part of such income ... in acquisition of any interest in. or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or
foreign commerce.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or
participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity ....
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section.
18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1988). The RICO convictions were predicated on 17 substantive obscenity violations, 12 counts under 18 U.S.C. § 1465 for interstate transport of obscene material for sale or distribution, and five counts under 18 U.S.C. § 1466 for engaging in the business of selling or transferring
obscene material transported through interstate commerce. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2769; see 18
U.S.C. §§ 1465-1466 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
2. See Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2770. The forfeiture was ordered under 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)
which reads in relevant part:
(a) Whoever violates any provision of section 1962 ... shall forfeit to the United States,
irrespective of any provision of State law(I) any interest the person has acquired or maintained in violation of section 1962;
(2) any(A) interest in ...
*..
or
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court ordered mandatory forfeiture of petitioner's businesses and business
assets, in addition to nearly $9 million in racketeering related earnings.3
Petitioner appealed the forfeiture order, arguing in part that the order
violated the Eighth Amendment. 4 The court of appeals upheld the forfeiture under traditional Eighth Amendment analysis using the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause.5 The Supreme Court granted certiorari' and
HELD, RICO forfeiture orders are subject to evaluation under the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment.'
Eighth Amendment analysis has been traditionally confined to reviewing criminal penalties under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.!
The Court implicitly continued this limitation when it declined to apply
the Excessive Fines Clause to a punitive damages award in BrowningFerris Industries v. Kelco Disposal.9 In Browning-Ferris, the jury found
the defendant had violated the Sherman Anti-Trust Act and Vermont state
law,"0 and awarded the plaintiff $6 million in punitive damages." On
appeal, the defendant challenged the award as an excessive fine under the
Eighth Amendment. 2
The Browning-FerrisCourt declined to extend Excessive Fines Clause

(D) property or contractual right of any kind affording a source of influence over:
any enterprise which the person has established, operated, controlled, conducted, or participated in the conduct of, in violation of section 1962. and
(3) any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds which the person obtained.
directly or indirectly, from racketeering activity ....
18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1988) (emphasis added).
3. Alexander. 113 S. Ct. at 2770: see United States v. Alexander, No. Crim. 4-89-85. 1990 WL
117882, at *2-7 (D. Minn. 1990).
4. Alexander v. Thornburgh. 943 F.2d 825. 827. 835 (8th Cir. 1991), vacated sub nom.. Alexander v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2766 (1993). The Eighth Amendment states, "Excessive bail shall not
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST.
amend. ViII. The petitioner also challenged the forfeiture as a violation of the First Amendment prohibition on prior restraints on speech. See Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2769-70. However, the Court rejected
this argument with extensive analysis. See id. at 2771-75.
5. See generally Alexander, 943 F.2d at 835-36 (holding that a review of the forfeiture is not
indicated by the Eighth Amendment because the sentence imposed was less than life imprisonment
without possibility of parole).
6. Alexander v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 3024 (1992).
7. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2775-76. The Court vacated the court of appeals' judgment and remanded for consideration of this issue. Id. at 2776.
8. See Craig W. Palm, RICO Forfeiture and the Eighth Amendment: When is Everything Too
Much?, 53 U. Ptrr. L. REV. 1, 42-44 (1991).
9. See 492 U.S. 257, 259-60 (1989).
10. Id. at 261. The jury found the defendant, a municipal waste disposal company, violated § 2
of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act by trying to monopolize a segment of the local trash collection industry, and violated Vermont tort law prohibiting intentional interference with contractual relations. Id.
11. Id. at 262. The $6 million award was in addition to $51,146 in compensatory damages. Id.
12. Id.
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protection to punitive damages awards in cases between private parties. 3
The majority noted that, although the Court had never considered an application of the Excessive Fines Clause alone, its previous interpretations of
the Eighth Amendment indicated the amendment's primary focus is on
criminal sanctions.' 4 Examining the history of the Eighth Amendment at
length, 5 the majority determined that "fines" were historically payments
to a sovereign as punishment. 6 The Excessive Fines Clause functioned to
prohibit the sovereign's abuse of its prosecutorial power. 7 Consequently,
the Browning-FerrisCourt found that the Excessive Fines Clause was not
intended to limit civil juries' damage awards. 8
Justice O'Connor dissented,' 9 arguing the Eighth Amendment should
apply to punitive damages awards. ° Justice O'Connor suggested a framework for determining when to apply the Excessive Fines Clause,2' and
how to evaluate the excessiveness of an award under an Eighth Amend-

ment analysis.' Justice O'Connor proposed that the Court's test for proportionality of criminal penalties under the Cruel and Unusual Punish-

ments Clause could be adopted as a foundation for analyzing the constitutional excessiveness of punitive damages.'

13. Id. at 260.
14. Id. at 262.
15. See id. at 264-65.
16. Id. at 265.
17. Id. at 266.
18. Id.
19. Browning-Ferris,492 U.S. at 282 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Stevens. dissented on the Eighth Amendment issue in its entirety.
See id. at 283. The concurring portion of her opinion is not relevant to the discussion of this comment.
20. Id. at 286-87.
21. Id. at 297-99. Justice O'Connor suggested support for the conclusion that punitive damages
should fall within the realm of an Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause analysis. Id. According
to Justice O'Connor. the history behind the Eighth Amendment and Court precedent on the purpose of
punitive damages showed that punitive damages awards are " 'privatefines levied by civil juries,' "
and therefore are subject to the Eighth Amendment because of their "penal nature." See id. at 297
(quoting Electrical Workers v. Foust. 442 U.S. 42, 48 (1979) (emphasis added by Court). The factors
generally used to determine that a sanction is "penal" are:
(1) whether it involves an affirmative disability; (2) whether it has historically been regarded as punishment; (3) whether it comes into play on a finding of scienter (4) whether its
operation will promote retribution and deterrence; (5) whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime: (6) whether there is an alternative purpose for it; and (7) whether it
is excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned.
Browning-Ferris,492 U.S. at 298. These factors come up in many of the cases addressed in this comment. but never in such an inclusive list nor as organized an application. See infra notes 39-44 and
accompanying text.
22. Browning-Ferris,492 U.S. at 300-01.
23. See id. at 297, 300. The Court evaluates the proportionality of a sentence under the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause based on three objective criteria. See generally Palm, supra note 8, at 4555 (discussing the evolution of the Court's approach to proportionality under the Eighth Amendment).
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The Excessive Fines Clause analysis articulated by Justice
O'Connor24 included three prongs.25 The first prong required a court reviewing a punitive damages award to pay "substantial deference" to any
legislative judgments regarding sanctions for the conduct being punished. 26 The second prong called for an examination of the gravity of the
defendant's conduct and the harshness of the punitive damages award.27
The final prong indicated the court should compare the sanction for
defendant's conduct to those civil and criminal sanctions imposed for
different conduct within the same jurisdiction and to those imposed for
similar conduct in other jurisdictions.28 Justice O'Connor would have remanded the case directing the court of appeals to use the Excessive Fines
Clause analysis to evaluate the punitive damages award.29
Three years later, the Supreme Court expanded the applicability of the
Excessive Fines Clause analysis in Austin v. United States.3" The court
ordered the Austin defendant, convicted under state drug law,3 to forfeit
his mobile home and auto body shop pursuant to a federal civil forfeiture
proceeding.32 The defendant contended that the forfeiture violated the
Excessive Fines Clause.33 In a narrow reading of the Browning-Ferris

The criteria the Court has used include the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty, the
sentences imposed on others in the same jurisdiction, and the sentences imposed for the same crime in
other jurisdictions. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983).
24. See supra note 21. Justice O'Connor suggested that the Court should apply the Solem proportionality framework under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause to civil forfeiture, as the Ninth
Circuit had done in United States v. Busher. See Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 300. In Busher, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that where there is "a prima facie showing that the forfeiture may
be excessive" in a civil forfeiture action, the court must apply the Solem proportionality test. United
States v. Busher, 817 F.2d 1409, 1415 (1987), affid on remand, 872 F.2d 431 (9th Cir. 1989) (emphasis added). If the court finds that the forfeiture is grossly disproportionate, it must limit either the
forfeiture order or the other sanctions in order to bring the whole punishment within the constitutional
limits of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 1416; see Palm, supra note 8, at 67-69.
25. See Browning-Ferris.492 U.S. at 300-01 (O'Connor, J.. concurring in part and dissenting in
part). These prongs were a modification of the Salem proportionality test. See supra note 23.
26. Browning-Ferris,492 U.S. at 301.
27. Id.
28. Id. Justice O'Connor noted that this prong should include an examination of both civil and
criminal penalties, due to the penal nature of civil jury punitive damages awards. Id.
29. Id.
30. 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
31. Id. at 2803. The Austin defendant pled guilty to possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, after state authorities purchased two grams of cocaine from defendant and discovered small
amounts of marijuana and cocaine, drug paraphernalia, and about $4,700 in cash in defendant's mobile
home and body shop. Id.
32. Id. The forfeiture order was issued by the trial court after the United States filed a civil in
rem action against the defendant under 21 U.S.C. § 881, the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention
and Control Act. Id. Section 881 provides for forfeiture of any conveyance or real property used to
transport, facilitate the sale, possess, or conceal controlled substances. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4), (7)
(1989).
33. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2804.
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holding,' the Austin Court explained that the Eighth Amendment does
not limit punitive damages awards when the government neither prosecuted the action nor is entitled to recover any of the award.35 The Austin
Court therefore implied that some government involvement is needed
before a judgment may be reviewed under the Excessive Fines Clause.36
In Austin, the Court held that the Excessive Fines Clause analysis applies to civil in rem forfeiture proceedings.37 The Austin Court's focus
was not on whether a forfeiture is civil or criminal, but instead, the Court
focused on whether the forfeiture38 is punitive in nature.39 The Court rejected the government's argument that forfeiture of the defendant's property was intended solely to remove tools of the drug trade and to compensate the government for law enforcement expenses.' The Austin Court
found that one of the purposes of the federal statute was to punish the
defendant.4
The Austin Court focused on two factors to determine whether to
apply an Excessive Fines Clause analysis to a civil forfeiture order.42
Those factors are the presence of government involvement43 and the underlying goal of punishment.' Although the Austin court provided guidance as to when Excessive Fine Clause analysis is proper, the Court declined to adopt a specific Excessive Fines Clause analysis,45 and remanded this issue to the court of appeals.46
Although the Austin majority offered no specific factors under an

34. See id. at 2804-05.
35. Id. at 2804.
36. See id.
37. Id. at 2803. The Austin Court incorporated much of the analysis and historical interpretation
of the Eighth Amendment from Justice O'Connor's Browning-Ferris dissent. See id. at 2804-05: cf.
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting
Browning-Ferris,492 U.S. at 286-87 (O'Connor, J.,
that the Eighth Amendment was not intended to be limited to criminal proceedings).
38. See supra note 32.
39. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2806.
40. Id. at 2811. However, the Court noted the possibility that different goals can sometimes legitimately be served by the same sanction. Id. at 2804-06; see also supra note 21 (discussing the test
used for determining whether a goal is "penal" in nature).
41. Austin, 113 S.Ct. at 2812 & n.14.
42. See id. at 2804-06.
43. Id. at 2804. The government involvement could either be through government prosecution, or
in cases where a private actor takes advantage of a civil forfeiture statute in which the government
receives some of the damages awarded. Id.; see supra note 36 and accompanying text.
44. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2804-06; see supra notes 21, 40-41 and accompanying text. Even if a
forfeiture statute serves more than one purpose, so long as it includes punishment as one of its purposes, it will not violate the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment. Austin, 113 S.Ct. at 2806
(citing to United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989)).
45. Id. at 2812. The Austin Court decided to allow the lower courts to determine the factors to be
considered in an analysis of whether a forfeiture is "excessive." Id.
46. Id.
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Excessive Fines Clause analysis, Justice Scalia's concurrence provided
some guidance. 47 Justice Scalia suggested one analysis for both monetary
fines 48 and in personam forfeitures, 49 and another analysis for civil in
rem forfeitures." The test for the former would evaluate the value of the
penalty in relation to the seriousness of the offense.5 The test for the
latter would evaluate "whether the confiscated property has a close enough
relationship to the offense."52 Although the majority accepted the relevance of the closeness factor to an Excessive Fines Clause analysis, it
declined to provide more specific guidelines on how the court of appeals
should structure the review on remand. 3
The purpose of RICO forfeitures was previously addressed by the
Supreme Court in Russello v. United States. 4 In Russello, the defendant
was convicted under RICO as a participant in an arson ring.5 The defendant contended that the profits and proceeds from the arson ring were not
forfeitable "interests" under RICO. 6 The Court ruled against the defendan 7 defining an interest under RICO as all profits and proceeds generated by the racketeering enterprise.5"
The Russello Court's broad interpretation of RICO was based upon an
examination of the structure and legislative history of the RICO statutory

47. See Austin, 113 S.Ct. at 2812-15 (Scalia, J., concurring).
48. Id. at 2814-15 (Scalia, J., concurring).
49. Id. at 2815.
50. Id. Justice Scalia also addressed the distinction made between in rem and in personam forfeitures. See id. at 2813-15. Justice Scalia noted that the case law on the culpability needed for forfeiture
actions in in rem and in personam forfeitures was ambiguous, and questioned whether it was even
necessary. Id. at 2814. The issue often recurs in cases like those addressed here. but an examination of
this issue is beyond the scope of this comment.
51. Id. at 2814-15. According to Justice Scalia, the Eighth Amendment's history shows that the
appropriate test "is value of the fine in relation to the offense." Id. at 2815. Justice Scalia also suggested that Alexander applied this test to in personam forfeiture. Id. However, the Alexander majority
declined to offer a standard and remanded the case for the court of appeals to develop appropriate
factors under the Excessive Fines analysis. Id. at 2776; see infra note 69 and accompanying text.
52. Austin, 113 S.Ct. at 2815 (Scalia, J., concurring).
53. Id. at 2812.
54. 464 U.S. 16 (1983).
55. Id. at 16, 18. The members of the ring secured inflated insurance appraisals on property they
owned. burned down the property, and then made insurance claims. Id. at 19. The defendant's profits
totalled $340,043.09 less $30,000.00 paid to another member for assistance in defrauding the insurance
company. Id. at 19-20.
56. Id. at 20. The government sought the forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(1). the same statute at issue in Alexander. For the text of the statute, see supra note 2.
57. Russello, 464 U.S. at 22.
58. Id.: see also id. at 22-26 (finding that the structure of the RICO statute provided for forfeiture
of not only interests in criminal enterprises, but also profits and proceeds from those enterprises). The
Russello interpretation was later codified into the RICO statute as § 1963(a)(3). Palm, supra note 8, at
30; see also supra note 2 (setting forth the text of the statute); Palm, supra note 8, at 13-42 (discussing the scope and interaction of all the RICO forfeitures under 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)).
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scheme.59 The Court recognized that the scheme was founded on a prosecutorial need to fight organized crime.' The Court noted the need for
increased sanctions and innovative remedies to reach criminals who successfully camouflaged their profits behind legitimate enterprises.6' The
special difficulties caused by enormous racketeering profits meant that
RICO had to be able to dismantle the racketeering enterprise itself.62
Congress concluded that the convicted defendant had-to be separated from
the proceeds of his crimes.63 The Russello Court found that Congress
tailored RICO's mandatory forfeiture statutes to achieve this goal,' and
the Court gave the RICO provision at issue65 its unanimous support&
and a broad interpretation.
In the instant case, the Supreme Court further extended the applicability of the Excessive Fines Clause.6" The issue in the instant case was
whether mandatory RICO in personam criminal forfeitures should be reviewed under the Eighth Amendment.69 The instant Court held that the
forfeitures are subject to Eighth Amendment review using an Excessive
Fines Clause analysis and remanded the case for determination of this
issue.7"
The instant Court rejected the court of appeals' Eighth Amendment
analysis.7' The court of appeals had held forfeiture of petitioner's property constitutional using traditional proportionality review under the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause. The instant Court held that this analysis failed to distinguish the Excessive Fines Clause as a distinct test to be
applied when the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause may not be
applicable.73 The Court found that the RICO in personam criminal forfeitures are punitive "fines" under the Eighth Amendment74 subject to an

59. See Russello. 464 U.S. at 22-26.
60. Id. at 27.
61. Id. at 27-28.

62. See id.
63. Id. at 28.
64. Id.
65. See supra note 56.
66. Russello, 464 U.S. at 17.
67. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
68. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2775-76.
69. Id. at 2775. The instant Court found that the appellate court failed to fully evaluate the Eighth
Amendment issue. Id. at 2770, 2775. The appellate court reviewed the forfeitures under the traditional
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause analysis without any consideration of the Excessive Fines
Clause analysis. See infra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
70. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2775-76.
71. Id. at 2775.
72. Id. See supra note 5 and accompanying text; Palm, supra note 8, at 42-59.
73. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2775.
74. Id. at 2775-76.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1993

7

Florida Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 3 [1993], Art. 4
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

Excessive Fines Clause analysis.75 While the instant Court emphasized
the magnitude of petitioner's racketeering enterprise and the extent of his
involvement,7 6 it again declined to set standards for an Excessive Fines
Clause analysis.77
The instant case extends the Excessive Fines Clause analysis to a new
area,78 RICO in personam criminal forfeitures.79 Austin reached a similar
result through the Court's focus on government involvement and punishment as two factors that indicate when an Excessive Fines Clause analysis
should be applied." The instant Court found both factors present in the
RICO in personam forfeitures and held that the Excessive Fines Clause
analysis applied.8
However, RICO forfeitures have evolved in response to organized
crime's abilities to raise incredible sums of money through racketeering
activities." This close relationship prompted the Russello Court to support congressional intent under RICO to separate defendants convicted of
racketeering from their enterprises and profits from those enterprises.83
Extension of the Excessive Fines Clause's protection to RICO defendants
may be contrary to Congress' aims in enacting RICO. If so, the instant
Court is cutting back on the support given to the RICO scheme in
Russello.8'
A complete Excessive Fines Clause analysis must balance constitutional concerns with the legitimate congressional goal of eradicating organized
crime. Justice O'Connor's approach to an Excessive Fines Clause analysis,
outlined in her Browning-Ferris dissent, is sensitive to the legislative
intent embodied in acts such as RICO." The first prong of this test
would call for a reviewing court to pay substantial deference to any legislative judgment regarding sanctions for the defendant's conduct.86 Thus,
congressional intent to separate convicted racketeers from their ill-gotten

75. Id. at 2776.
76. Id.
77. Id. This ruling paralleled the Court's holding in Austin, decided the same term. See supra
notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
78. See Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2775-76. As discussed earlier, the Court has also extended the
Excessive Fines Clause analysis to civil in rem forfeitures under 21 U.S.C. § 881. See supra note 37
and accompanying text.
79. Alexander. 113 S. Ct. at 2775-76.
80. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
81. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2775-76.
82. See Russello. 464 U.S. at 28.
83. Id. at 28-29.
84. See supra notes 59-67 and accompanying text.
85. See Browning-Ferris,492 U.S. at 300-01 (O'Connor, J.. concurring in part and dissenting in
part). For a thorough discussion of Justice O'Connor's approach. see supra notes 19-29 and accompanying text.
86. Browning-Ferris,492 U.S. at 301.
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gains 7 would weigh heavily in favor of upholding the forfeiture order
against the petitioner in the instant case.88
The second prong of Justice O'Connor's test would require the reviewing court to examine the gravity of the defendant's conduct and the
harshness of the penalty.89 As part of his punishment, beyond a jail sentence and fines," the petitioner in the instant case was deprived of several properties and nearly $9 million pursuant to RICO's forfeiture provisions.91 However, the petitioner had an extensive criminal enterprise and
took elaborate steps to conceal it and the revenue it generated. 92 To the
extent that the petitioner's activity amounted to "racketeering," it falls
within the scope of activity which RICO forfeitures, however harsh, are
designed to halt. 3
The third prong under Justice O'Connor's approach would require a
reviewing court to examine its jurisdiction's punishment policies.94 The
test compares the penalties imposed under the statute in question to those
for other crimes within the jurisdiction and to those for similar crimes in
other jurisdictions.9 5 As the Russello Court noted, "the RICO statute was
intended to provide new weapons of unprecedented scope for an assault
upon organized crime and its economic roots,"96 and paved the way for
the adoption of similar racketeering statutes in over half the states.97 Forfeiture also has been used by the federal government and many states in
prosecuting narcotics cases.98 Broad forfeiture has become a commonly
used method to combat organized crime and is seen as necessary to both
incapacitate a defendant's criminal organization 9 and prevent its later revival."r While punishment under RICO is a unique legislative response

87. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
88. See supra notes 59-67 and accompanying text.
89. Browning-Ferris,492 U.S. at 301 (O'Connor, J.,concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The forfeiture order at issue in the instant case deprived the petitioner of $9 million, in addition to
other retail and wholesale interests. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. The forfeiture order was
issued after the petitioner had been convicted of 17 acts of transporting and engaging in the business
of selling obscene material. See supra notes i-2 and accompanying text.90. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2770. The petitioner was sentenced to six years in prison, and was
ordered to pay $100.000 in fines in addition to the costs of his prosecution, incarceration, and release.
Id.
91. Id.
92. Alexander, 943 F.2d at 827-29.
93. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2776.
94. Browning-Ferris,492 U.S. at 301 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
95. Id.
96. Russello, 464 U.S. at 26.
97. Palm, supra note 8. at 60.
98. See supra note 32; Austin. 113 S. Ct. at 2803: United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave.. 113 S.
Ct. 1126, 1133 & n.16 (1993).
99. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
100. Palm, supra note 8, at 2-3.
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to racketeering, its forfeiture scheme utilizes an approach commonly found
in other jurisdictions to combat similar organized crimes, such as narcotics
trafficking.' Therefore, the RICO statute, though unique within its jurisdiction, is consistent with other jurisdictions' punitive approaches to simi102
lar criminal activity.
In contrast to the test adopted by Justice O'Connor," 3 Justice Scalia
offered an alternative Excessive Fines Clause analysis in Austin." Under
Justice Scalia's approach, a reviewing court would evaluate the value of
the penalty in relation to the gravity of the offense committed. 5 The
forfeiture's value in the instant case is its ability to incapacitate the
petitioner's racketeering enterprise."° Applying Justice Scalia's approach,
the reviewing court would rank the instant petitioner's sale of obscene
material in the hierarchy of criminal activity.' 7 Justice Scalia suggested
that the gravity of the Austin defendant's criminal activity may be sufficient to pass this test,'0 8 even though the Austin defendant was a
smalltime narcotics dealer with only a few assets to forfeit."° The instant
petitioner's involvement in criminal activity goes far beyond the Austin
defendant's activity."0 The instant petitioner owned a multi-million dollar business."' Absent forfeiture, the petitioner would serve a six year
prison sentence and pay a $100,000 fine,"- but he would be able to return to his $9 million empire upon release from prison. Permitting the
petitioner to keep proceeds connected to his racketeering activity would
allow him a healthy profit from his crimes." 3 Due to the vast profits involved in organized crimes, successful RICO prosecutions pursuant to
congressional intent may require reviewing courts to consider a multifactor Eighth Amendment analysis including Justice Scalia's approach." 4
Combining Justice Scalia and Justice O'Connor's approaches yields a
well-rounded Excessive Fines Clause analysis." 5' Legislative and prose101. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
102. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 19-29, 85-102 and accompanying text.
104. See Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2812-15 (Scalia. J., concurring); supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
105. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2814-15 (Scalia, J., concurring).
106. See Russello, 464 U.S. at 28; supra notes 59-67. 82-83 and accompanying text.
107. See Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2814-15.
108. Id.
109. See supra notes 31-32.
110. Compare Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2769-70 (involving a multi-million dollar obscenity business) with Austin. 113 S. Ct. at 2803 (involving a smalltime drug dealer).
111. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
112. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
113. See Alexander. 113 S. Ct. at 2766: supra note 3 and accompanying text.
114. See Austin. 113 S. Ct. at 2811 & n.15. The Austin Court declined to construct such a multifactor test. See id.
115. See supra notes 47-52, 104-14 and accompanying text (elaborating on Justice Scalia's analy-
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cutorial goals, the gravity of a defendant's conduct, the harshness and the
value of a penalty, and the approaches of other jurisdictions would be
adequate starting points in evaluating forfeiture orders.t" 6 By extending
the Excessive Fines Clause to protect RICO defendants," 7 the instant
Court opened a door for members of sophisticated, organized criminal
ventures to profit from their activities."' These racketeering defendants
may have gained an opportunity to devise ways to keep their most precious commodities-illegal profits. RICO's efficacy in dismantling organized crime depends on how the courts of appeals interpret and apply an
Excessive Fines Clause analysis. "9 This new area of Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence, therefore, should be defined very carefully. The analysis
chosen by the courts will greatly impact both individual liberties and the
government's ability to fight organized crime.

sis); supra notes 19-29, 85-102 and accompanying text (elaborating on Justice O'Connor's analysis).
116. See supra note 115.
117. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
119. See generally Palm, supra note 8, at 2-6 (discussing congressional intent to expand RICO
forfeiture provisions in response to limits imposed on RICO by the courts).
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